Reference health

The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1676863
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54/54 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

14 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 54 checked references that resolve
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The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
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Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation
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The Impact of Party and Ideology on Roll‐Call Voting in State Legislatures
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Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators
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Ideology and the Congressional Vote Appendix
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The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedDirect Democracy in the American States: An Analysis of Roll Call Votes
no DOI — not checkedTesting Accounts of Legislative Strategic Voting
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no DOI — not checkedref64
no DOI — not checkedref65
no DOI — not checkedParties and Stability in Legislative Voting Coalitions in the American States
no DOI — not checkedref68
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