Reference health
Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs: An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy
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References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1093/jleo/19.2.281
The 73 checked references that resolve
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Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
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Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities<sup>*</sup>
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Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies
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Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation
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Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States
resolves10.1017/s0007123408000112
The Politics of When: Redistribution, Investment and Policy Making for the Long Term
resolves10.1017/s0003055403000777
The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036849
The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation
resolves10.3386/w14655
Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements
resolves10.4135/9781848608047.n19
Party System Institutionalization and Party System
Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization*
resolves10.2307/1073179
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies
resolves10.2307/2235106
The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042166
TIME-INCONSISTENCY, DEMOCRACY, AND OPTIMAL CONTINGENT RULES
resolves10.1017/s0022050700009451
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
resolves10.2307/2937850
Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences
resolves10.1111/polp.12019
Explaining Cross‐Border Political Activities among <scp>L</scp>atino Immigrants in the <scp>U</scp>nited <scp>S</scp>tates
resolves10.1007/bf02699764
Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1820933
Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1821914
Political Institutions, Intertemporal Cooperation, and the Quality of Policies
resolves10.1017/s0003055405051683
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
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Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism
resolves10.1086/261528
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
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Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
The 36 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedCredibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters
no DOI — not checkedOn the Road to Good Governance: Recovering from Economic and Political Shocks in Brazil
no DOI — not checkedPolitical Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Chile
no DOI — not checkedQuestions About a Paradox: Are There Answers?
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no DOI — not checkedThe Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes
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no DOI — not checkedThe Politics of Policies. The Role of Political Process in Successful Public Policies. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean
no DOI — not checkedBacking into the Future: Reconceiving Policy Reform as Intertemporal Choice
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no DOI — not checkedOptimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility
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no DOI — not checkedAdministrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
no DOI — not checkedOrganization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond
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no DOI — not checkedInstitutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems
no DOI — not checkedPolitical Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Argentina
no DOI — not checkedPolitical Institutions, Policymaking and Policy: An Introduction
no DOI — not checkedThe Institutional Determinants of State Capabilities in Latin America
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no DOI — not checkedThe Mechanisms of Governance
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