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Managerial Remuneration and Disciplining in the UK: A Tale of Two Governance Regimes

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1723462
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59/59 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-24

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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no DOI — not checkedCash-based executive compensation in Spain and UK
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