Reference health

Bundling, A La Carte Pricing and Vertical Bargaining in a Two-Sided Model

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1748564
CiteStamped reference-health badge
23/23 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 23 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1886045
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.03.002
Tying and freebies in two-sided markets
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x
Competition in two-sided markets
resolves10.1287/mnsc.45.12.1613
Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency
resolves10.2307/1593720
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1757214
Mixed Bundling in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1257/aer.101.1.263
Bundle-Size Pricing as an Approximation to Mixed Bundling
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00426.x
TYING IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI‐HOMING<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1016/j.infoecopol.2007.06.005
Bundling, product choice, and efficiency: Should cable television networks be offered à la carte?
resolves10.1007/s11151-008-9196-6
Economics at the FCC: 2007–2008
resolves10.1257/aer.102.2.643
The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets
resolves10.2307/2534783
Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure
resolves10.2307/2555664
Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger
resolves10.1257/aer.96.3.756
On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design
resolves10.2307/2937852
Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values
resolves10.1257/0002828041464632
Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Reply
resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00222.x
<scp>The Role of Upstream‐Downstream Competition on Bundling Decisions: Should Regulators Force Firms to Unbundle?</scp>
resolves10.1162/154247603322493212
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.01.002
Tying in two-sided markets and the honor all cards rule
resolves10.1086/296250
Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00425
Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
resolves10.2307/2555525
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511625930
Market Microstructure
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedReport on the Packaging and Sale of Video Programming Services to the Public
no DOI — not checkedFurther Report on the Packaging and Sale of Video Programming Services to the Public
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

view as graph · paper page

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1748564"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1748564/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1748564/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1748564)