Reference health

Mutual Monitoring and Corporate Governance

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1760579
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 41 checked references that resolve
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Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
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Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
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Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
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The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
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Boards: Does one size fit all☆
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Co-opted Boards
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Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance
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Stock option plans for non-executive employees
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The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields
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Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings
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Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence
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Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
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Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?
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Crime and Social Interactions
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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
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An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers
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The Determination of the Order of an Autoregression
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Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options
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Moral Hazard and Observability
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The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans
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Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies
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Optimal Dissent in Organizations
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.008
Mutual monitoring and corporate governance
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(90)90069-C
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
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Chapter 38 Executive compensation
resolves10.1093/rfs/14.3.735
The Endogeneity of Managerial Compensation in Firm Valuation: A Solution
resolves10.1016/0005-1098(78)90005-5
Modeling by shortest data description
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ONE HAT TOO MANY: KEY EXECUTIVE PLURALITY AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedProduction, information costs, and economic organization
no DOI — not checkedref7
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no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedBoards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature
no DOI — not checkedCEO replacement under Private Information
no DOI — not checkedTheory of rational option pricing
no DOI — not checkedDisclosing misconduct in work organizations: An empirical analysis of the situational factors that foster whistleblowing
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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