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The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820060
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1 of 47 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

18 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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The 18 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBudget Deficits and Budget Institutions
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no DOI — not checkedThe Policy Making Process of Tax Reform in Latin America
no DOI — not checkedFallos y Fallas Econ�micas de las Altas Cortes: el Caso de Colombia
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no DOI — not checkedBudget Institutions and Fiscal Outcomes
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no DOI — not checkedManaging Fiscal Policy in Latin America
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no DOI — not checkedDPI2004 Database of Political Institutions 2004: Changes and Variables Definitions
no DOI — not checkedThe Political and Economic Determinants of Budgetary Consolidation in Europe
no DOI — not checkedFiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters
no DOI — not checkedDo Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems
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no DOI — not checkedBudgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Community
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