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Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1844747
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1 of 14 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 13 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/bf01215380
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
resolves10.1016/b978-0-12-370182-4.50025-8
On the Core of the Assignment Game
resolves10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7
Core-selecting package auctions
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game
resolves10.1007/b138401
Differential Information Economies
resolves10.1162/003355300554719
The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00499.x
Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
resolves10.1002/nav.3800090106
Complements and substitutes in the opttmal assignment problem
resolves10.1016/b978-0-444-53187-2.00017-6
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources
resolves10.2307/1909750
Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1687144
Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedMechanisn design with collusion and correlation
no DOI — not checkedAuction design in the presence of collusion
no DOI — not checkedA natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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