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The Effect of Foreign Reinvestment and Financial Reporting Incentives on Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1863988
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The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedGSK pays 'Biggest tax settlement in U.S. history
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no DOI — not checkedWhy reported effective corporate tax rates are falling
no DOI — not checkedThe role of taxes in location and sourcing decisions
no DOI — not checkedFirms whose five-year sum of total or foreign income was negative, or whose value of FTR, defined in equation (1), was outside the range of [-1, +1] were excluded. Industries were determined using three-digit NAICS codes. Industries with less than 1% of the observations were combined with other, similar industries (sometimes leading to aggregation to the two-digit level)
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no DOI — not checkedTo proxy for foreign reinvestment-related incentives, an indicator variable, HighRRI, equal to one if the growth in foreign sales is in the top 50% of the distribution for time t. To proxy for financial reporting incentives, an indicator variable, HighFRI , equal to one when a firm has high financial reporting aggressiveness measured as the upper 25 th percentile of the Francis
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no DOI — not checkedThe proxy for financial reporting incentives, (FRI), in columns (A) and (B) is the same as in main regressions found in Table 3. In columns (C) and (D), the proxy for high financial reporting incentives is an indicator variable, HighFRI, equal to one when a firm states in the notes to the financial statements that it has permanently reinvested earnings and either (1) gives a value for the taxes not recorded or (2) states that the amount of
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