Reference health

Trusting Your Beliefs: Understanding Beliefs and Behavior in a Trust Game

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1884352
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42/42 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-04

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 42 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/796722
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules
resolves10.2307/2951741
Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1027
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
resolves10.2307/1073526
Economic Rationales for Mediation
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00108-6
Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.x
THEORIES OF COMMITMENT, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: EVIDENCE FROM LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
resolves10.1257/aer.96.5.1737
Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
resolves10.1006/game.1999.0715
Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
resolves10.1006/game.1996.0081
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-4307-4
Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners
resolves10.2139/ssrn.205391
Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts
resolves10.1257/0002828042002741
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036993
A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the <italic>State Farm</italic> and <italic>Grove City</italic> Cases
resolves10.2307/1123202
Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation
resolves10.1162/003355300554926
Measuring Trust*
resolves10.1257/aer.91.5.1402
Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1099369
Shareholder Initiative: An Informal Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach
resolves10.1017/s0003055407070499
Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?
resolves10.1086/468002
Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective
resolves10.2307/1914185
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
resolves10.1162/003355300555475
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
resolves10.1038/nature03701
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
resolves10.1037//0022-3514.34.1.69
Expectations of choice behavior held by cooperators, competitors, and individualists across four classes of experimental games.
resolves10.3386/w5864
Trust in Large Organizations
resolves10.2307/1123093
Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors
resolves10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.04.004
A Bayesian view of covariation assessment
resolves10.4324/9781315082349-37
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs
resolves10.1007/s10818-006-0004-9
Mindreading and Manipulation in an Ecology of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Laboratory Experiments
resolves10.2307/2235360
Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods
resolves10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
resolves10.1257/jep.15.1.219
Anomalies: Risk Aversion
resolves10.1086/468167
Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law
resolves10.1016/s0144-8188(97)00020-3
The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design
resolves10.2307/796619
The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures
resolves10.1086/467291
Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts
resolves10.1086/467950
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(94)90103-1
Experimental evidence on players' models of other players
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1031
On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1257/0895330041371321
Prediction Markets
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00609
Trust and Growth
resolves10.1017/s0140525x05400060
trust: a temporary human attachment facilitated by oxytocin
resolves10.1196/annals.1314.025
The Neurobiology of Trust
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedIs Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedEconomic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedref50
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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