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Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1885606
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26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 26 checked references that resolve
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resolves10.2307/2951643
Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
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resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00114-6
Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership
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N<scp>onlinear</scp> P<scp>ricing and</scp> O<scp>ligopoly</scp>
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The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedOne should however observe that the introduction of exclusivity clauses is not sufficient to fully characterize the equilibrium outcomes as long as attention is restricted to direct incentive compatible mechanisms. In multiple-agent frameworks, principals can use complex communication schemes to induce correlation in agents' participation choices. These behaviors cannot always be reproduced by type-revelation direct mechanisms
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedNegotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency
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