Reference health
Mechanisms of Board Turnover: Evidence from Backdating
1 of 34 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-16
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1787/9789264067110-5-en
The 33 checked references that resolve
resolves10.5465/amj.2006.23478165
A Changing of the Guard: Executive and Director Turnover Following Corporate Financial Restatements
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn054
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4
What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00055
The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREF
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00522
New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310
resolves10.2308/accr.2006.81.1.83
The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.12.004
Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating
resolves10.1017/s0022109000002222
Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings
resolves10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199711/12)18:7/8<587::aid-mde855>3.3.co;2-i
The causes and consequences of accounting fraud
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00108-9
Takeover bids and target directors’ incentives: the impact of a bid on directors’ wealth and board seats
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.003
Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants?
resolves10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00804.x
The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00046-9
Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00172.x
Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedThe SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law
no DOI — not checkedThe Insignificance of Proxy Access
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