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When are Signing Bonuses More than Just ‘Pay to Play’? An Experimental Investigation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910237
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3 of 63 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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no DOI — not checkedBargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study
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