Reference health
The Impact of Operational Decisions on the Design of Salesforce Incentives
34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 34 checked references that resolve
resolves10.5465/amj.2007.24634448
Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay for Performance: An Experimental Investigation
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1040.0217
Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning
resolves10.1287/opre.1040.0127
Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies with Random Demand and Fixed Ordering Cost: The Finite Horizon Case
resolves10.1016/j.orl.2012.11.010
Salesforce contract design and inventory planning with asymmetric risk-averse sales agents
resolves10.1287/msom.1060.0150
Store Manager Incentive Design and Retail Performance: An Exploratory Investigation
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2010.06.016
Inventory and sales effort management under unobservable lost sales
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2319865
Can We All Get Along? Incentive Contracts to Bridge the Marketing and Operations Divide
resolves10.1287/mnsc.45.3.346
Stalking Information: Bayesian Inventory Management with Unobserved Lost Sales
resolves10.1002/bbpc.19950990427
F. Iachello, R.D. Levine: <i>Algebraic Theory of Molecules</i>, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, ISBN 0‐19‐508091‐2, 1995.
resolves10.1287/mksc.1040.0102
Delegating Pricing Decisions in Competitive Markets with Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
resolves10.1016/S0272-6963(02)00005-0
The integration of manufacturing and marketing/sales decisions: impact on organizational performance
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1620662
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
resolves10.1287/opre.1070.0451
A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedTie saleman's bonuses to forecasts
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no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedCan marketing and manufacturing coexist?
no DOI — not checkedref47
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