Reference health
Inconsistent People? An Experiment on the Impact of Social Preferences Across Games
1 of 55 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1007/bf01669208
The 54 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/000282803322157034
What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00302
Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00860.x
Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
resolves10.1007/s10683-011-9272-x
The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1977749
The Promise and Success of Lab-Field Generalizability in Experimental Economics: A Critical Reply to Levitt and List
resolves10.1016/0022-1031(89)90036-x
Statistical criteria for establishing a truly false consensus effect
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1883767
Are Preferences Stable Across Domains? An Experimental Investigation of Social Preferences in the Field
resolves10.1257/0002828042002741
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
resolves10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01008-6
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
resolves10.1257/aer.100.1.541
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
resolves10.1257/0002828043052187
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
resolves10.7551/mitpress/2604.003.0006
Conditional Cooperation: Behavioral Regularities from the Lab and the Field and Their Policy Implications
resolves10.1207/s15327663jcp0802_01
Constructing Stable Preferences: A Look Into Dimensions of Experience and Their Impact on Preference Stability
resolves10.1037//0022-3514.72.4.810
The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.
resolves10.1257/jep.21.2.153
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
resolves10.1016/0022-1031(85)90020-4
The false consensus effect: A meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests
resolves10.1177/0951629811398687
Paradox lost: Explaining and modeling seemingly random individual behavior in social dilemmas
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.011
Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2337794
Game Specific Social Preferences: Different Types and a Canceling-Out Effect
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1924864
Inconsistent People? An Experiment on the Impact of Social Preferences Across Games
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.006
Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences
resolves10.1023/A:1026257921046
Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games
resolves10.1016/b978-1-85617-094-9.50028-1
SynOptics Token-Ring Support Within Network Utility Architecture
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedAn Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedref60
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1924864"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1924864/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1924864)