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Individual Vs. Role Dependent Social Preferences: Evidence from Bargaining Experiments

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1927155
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1 of 34 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-05

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

21 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 33 checked references that resolve
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How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?
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Is altruism evolutionarily stable?
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On the equal division core
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Experimental economics: Where next?
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Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study
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A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00079-2
Is altruism evolutionarily stable? And envy and malevolence?
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Personality influences on ultimatum bargaining decisions
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Sex Roles
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Just Luck: An Experimental Study of Risk-Taking and Fairness
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A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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What to maximize if you must
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An application of Selten's measure of predictive success
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Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00503-1
Distributional concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented?
resolves10.1111/jeea.12006
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.011
Altruism spillovers: Are behaviors in context-free experiments predictive of altruism toward a naturally occurring public good?
resolves10.2458/azu_acku_ds355_hay88_1379
چهره های شگفت انگیز تاریخ افغانستان : ملوک کرت / مولف عبدالشکور حکم ؛ مرتب کننده عبدالحبیب حکم
resolves10.1007/s001820400184
A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game
resolves10.1007/s001820300127
The assignment game: the ?-value
resolves10.1007/s10683-010-9270-4
Matching markets with price bargaining
resolves10.1016/j.socec.2011.04.010
Multiple facets of altruism and their influence on blood donation
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00078-0
On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences
resolves10.2307/1912531
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
resolves10.1027/1864-9335/a000027
The Effect of Priming Gender Roles on Women’s Implicit Gender Beliefs and Career Aspirations
resolves10.1006/game.1997.0630
More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
resolves10.1007/bf01753437
The assignment game I: The core
resolves10.1007/s001820100072
Assignment games with stable core
resolves10.1007/s001820050126
The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
resolves10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.065
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resolves10.1006/obhd.1999.2861
The Negotiation Matching Process: Relationships and Partner Selection
The 21 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedG? uth and Yaari (1992) apply this concept to (parameters of) preferences; that is, if a population has adopted an evolutionary stable parameter a i of equation (1), then a deviating individual with another parameter would earn less income. While individuals act according to their preferences, 'survival' in the population is determined by their income
no DOI — not checkedref3
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no DOI — not checkedpossibly due to its direct face-to-face negotiation characteristic. The smaller amount to be earned under the 293 market setting, due to a higher percentage of people not being in a match, was balanced by a Raven intelligence test at the end of the experiment, where participants could earn up to an additional ? 6. Thus the average earning of ?14.51 here includes ?4.87 as an incentive for the test
no DOI — not checkedref12
no DOI — not checkedThe ? in equal split solutions can be interpreted as a measure of generosity, inertia or an insurance premium for not being left alone. For our experimental results, the estimation ? = 120 seems to exclude its interpretation as random error or
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkeddefine strength in an asymmetric two-player contest model by the costs of effort. They show that under the viewpoint of material payoff, the stronger player should have more hateful
no DOI — not checkedA theory of marriage
no DOI — not checkedAn evolutionary approach to explain reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game
no DOI — not checkedDelegation in first-price all-pay auctions
no DOI — not checkedEqual share analysis of characteristic function experiments
no DOI — not checkedref52
no DOI — not checkedref55
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