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Are Powerful Majorities Inefficient for Parties and Efficient for Taxpayers? An Analysis of Budget Maximization in the U.S.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1943572
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 31 checked references that resolve
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no DOI — not checkedThe Political economy of deregulation: Interest groups in the regulatory process
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