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In Dubio Pro Reo: Behavioral Explanations of Pro-Defendant Bias in Procedures

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986088
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1 of 49 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-10-14

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

16 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0033-2909.115.2.243
The 48 checked references that resolve
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Deadly Dilemmas
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The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence
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Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?
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Guilt in Games
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Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
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Commentaries on The Laws Of England
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Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards
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The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes
resolves10.1080/02699930600980874
Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt
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Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof
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Crime versus Justice: Is There a Trade‐Off?
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On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent
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Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs
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The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement
resolves10.1086/259616
On the Economics of Law and Order
resolves10.1086/656028
A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure
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Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
resolves10.1257/jep.5.1.193
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
resolves10.1086/467927
The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis
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Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System
resolves10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001
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Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law
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Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior
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The meanings of shame: Implications for legal reform.
resolves10.2139/ssrn.580843
Norms in Law and Economics
resolves10.1016/0144-8188(91)90022-6
Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence
resolves10.2139/ssrn.306562
Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2005.05.002
Should the Standard of Proof be Lowered to Reduce Crime?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00423.x
THE BECKER PARADOX AND TYPE I VERSUS TYPE II ERRORS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME*
resolves10.1016/0144-8188(86)90042-6
Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error
resolves10.1016/s1574-0730(07)01006-7
Chapter 6 The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
resolves10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2745-1
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resolves10.2307/1229527
An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7
A theory of anticipated utility
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00158
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resolves10.1257/jep.15.1.219
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resolves10.1017/s0265052500000844
On the Common Saying that it is Better that Ten Guilty Persons Escape than that One Innocent Suffer:<i>Pro</i>and<i>Con</i>
resolves10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y
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resolves10.2307/2555555
Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings
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resolves10.1086/467970
On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036853
Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials
resolves10.1007/bf00122574
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On the Economics of Moral Preferences
resolves10.2307/3312707
n Guilty Men
resolves10.1111/1540-5982.00136
A model of evidence production and optimal standard of proof and penalty in criminal trials
The 16 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedComposite Prospect Theory: A proposal to combine 'prospect theory'and 'cumulative prospect theory
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of Shame: Why More Shaming may Deter Less
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedEmotions and Economic Theory
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedWhat's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions
no DOI — not checkedShaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
no DOI — not checkedExperimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
no DOI — not checkedMonitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedThe optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines
no DOI — not checkedPlea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
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