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Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031801
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18/18 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 18 checked references that resolve
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CEO Compensation and Board Structure
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The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors
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When are outside directors effective?☆
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Discussion of Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?
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Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00896-3
Industry costs of equity
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.007
Board structure and price informativeness☆
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.012
Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.001
Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights
resolves10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199711/12)18:7/8<587::aid-mde855>3.3.co;2-i
The causes and consequences of accounting fraud
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp024
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhg039
Advertising, Breadth of Ownership, and Liquidity
resolves10.2307/2491427
A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.1999.tb00592.x
Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure*
resolves10.2139/ssrn.899096
Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01564.x
The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedDiscouraging rivals: managerial rent-seeking and economic inefficiencies
no DOI — not checkedref14
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