Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 28 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedMonopolistic Competition, Second Best, and THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A Review Article, 77 MICH
no DOI — not checkedInternational Competition, Market Definition, and the Appropriate Way to Analyze the Legality of Horizontal Mergers Under the Clayton Act: A Critique of Both the Traditional Approach and the Justice Department's Horizontal Merger Guidelines
no DOI — not checkedAdmittedly, one empirically unimportant part of Section 2 of the Clayton Act promulgates an -injury to competitor? test of legality that is very different from the -lessening competition? test of legality the rest of the statute promulgates. I should also point out that the text assumes that the antitrust part of the -unfair competition? test of illegality promulgated by the third major U.S. antitrust statute-the Federal Trade Commission Act
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no DOI — not checkedMy definition is narrower than its standard counterpart, which defines a choice to be oligopolistic when the actor realizes that its pay-off will be affected either by the choices that identifiable rivals have already made or (somewhat more narrowly) by the responses the choice elicits from one or more identifiable rivals-i.e., to be oligopolistic when it manifests simple, two-stage recognized interdependence rather than the more-complex, three-stage type of recognized interdependence that is the identifying characteristic of the conduct I call -oligopolistic.? Thus, the interdependence that is the basis of the leading conjectural-variations models of oligopolistic pricing is backward-looking: in the Cournot model, each firm assumes that its output-decision will not affect its rivals' output choices; in the Bertrand model, each firm assumes that its price decision will not affect its rivals' price decisions; and in the Stackelberg model, a leader-firm profits from the fact that its followers behave in the way that the Cournot model assumes. The interdependence that many of the more modern, game-theoretic, -oligopolistic-pricing? models posit, though forward-looking, is also two-stage (simple) recognized interdependence. For a discussion of several of these gametheoretic models that substantiates this conclusion, see
no DOI — not checkedOligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence and a Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27 STAN
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