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In Broad Daylight: Full Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Promote Cooperation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2079146
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1 of 33 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

4 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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The 32 checked references that resolve
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Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011
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resolves10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9
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resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z
Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
resolves10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0
Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1788915
Can We Manage First Impressions in Cooperation Problems? An Experimental Study on 'Broken (and Fixed) Windows'
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x
Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.980
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1038/415137a
Altruistic punishment in humans
resolves10.1257/aer.100.1.541
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
resolves10.1126/science.1123633
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
resolves10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202
Why People Punish Defectors
resolves10.1126/science.1153808
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02288.x
The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment
resolves10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017
Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
resolves10.1093/oseo/instance.00022405
1739 LOCKE to JOHN AUBREY, 18 May 1694 (1714)
resolves10.1353/scb.2005.0005
Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration by John Locke
resolves10.1257/000282803321455359
Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01520.x
<scp>Cooperation Norms in Multiple‐Stage Punishment</scp>
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.017
Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds
resolves10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3
A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.014
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.018
The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation
resolves10.2307/1964229
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x
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resolves10.1023/A:1026277420119
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resolves10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref36
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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