Reference health

Soft Shareholder Activism

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2081859
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48/48 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-25

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 48 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.101.7.2955
Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp037
The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice
resolves10.1086/261965
Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium
resolves10.1007/s10679-004-2542-0
Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn054
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1616340
Hedge Fund Activism in Europe
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(93)90039-e
The hidden costs of stock market liquidity
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.15240
Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control
resolves10.1146/annurev-financial-110311-101826
The Real Effects of Financial Markets
resolves10.2307/2555842
When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01373.x
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
resolves10.1162/003355397555325
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00055
The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREF
resolves10.1257/aer.103.1.47
Pandering to Persuade
resolves10.2307/1123064
Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht001
Optimal Corporate Governance in the Presence of an Activist Investor
resolves10.2307/1913390
Strategic Information Transmission
resolves10.1111/jofi.12308
The Wall Street Walk when Blockholders Compete for Flows
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2154724
Active Ownership
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02726.x
Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x
Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.11.005
Short-term termination without deterring long-term investment: A theory of debt and buyouts
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht012
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq145
Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhh002
Public Trading and Private Incentives:
resolves10.1111/1475-679x.00006
Imperfect Information and Credible Communication
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1705707
The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.007
Stock price informativeness, cross-listings, and investment decisions
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.007
The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential decision model
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00467.x
Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq081
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management
resolves10.1086/261893
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.45483
Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention
resolves10.2307/1913210
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
resolves10.2307/2601007
Noise Trading and Takeovers
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01682.x
Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals
resolves10.3982/ecta6178
Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers
resolves10.2307/2937851
Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.35053
Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1571046
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02395.x
Managerial Incentives for Short‐term Results
resolves10.1093/rfs/15.1.289
Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure
resolves10.1257/aer.90.3.705
Herd Behavior and Investment: Reply
resolves10.1007/s00182-017-0571-0
Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
resolves10.1086/261385
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1959613
What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors
resolves10.1086/261524
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
resolves10.2307/2937861
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe myth of the shareholder franchise
no DOI — not checkedCorporate governance and the new hedge fund activism
no DOI — not checkedCheap talk with two audiences
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref48
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