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The Effect of Capital Structure and Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: A Test of Reverse Causality Hypothesis in Three ASEAN Countries

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084429
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 38 checked references that resolve
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no DOI — not checkedCorporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives
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