Reference health

Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2126767
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30/30 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 30 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2971707
A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development
resolves10.1109/emr.1975.4306431
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
resolves10.2307/1907353
Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
resolves10.1086/261876
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development
resolves10.2307/2552442
An Economic Theory of Clubs
resolves10.1086/260719
Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm
resolves10.2307/2526561
Comment: General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.2247
Valuation Equilibrium with Clubs
resolves10.2307/1911818
The Decomposition Algorithm for Linear Programs
resolves10.1073/pnas.40.7.588
VALUATION EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO OPTIMUM
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00073
Clubs and the Market
resolves10.2307/1911125
Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.2307/3003320
Moral Hazard and Observability
resolves10.2307/3003457
Moral Hazard in Teams
resolves10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
resolves10.1006/jeth.1993.1050
Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing
resolves10.2307/1907742
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0092
Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization
resolves10.2307/1907777
On the Existence of General Equilibrium for a Competitive Market
resolves10.2307/1912505
The Classical Theorem on Existence of Competitive Equilibrium
resolves10.2307/3003192
The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
resolves10.2307/2297432
Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
resolves10.1111/j.1467-999x.1960.tb00275.x
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
resolves10.2307/1911459
Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
resolves10.2307/2648863
General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
resolves10.1016/s0165-1889(03)00053-8
Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition algorithm
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037011
Cooperation versus Competition in Agency
resolves10.2307/3003456
Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings
resolves10.1017/ccol0521430194.003
Collusion and the theory of organizations
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedIntroduction to Linear Optimization
no DOI — not checkedRegulating Trade Among Agents
no DOI — not checkedThe Firm and the Plant in General Equilibrium Theory
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedref33
no DOI — not checkedAssignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings
no DOI — not checkedref36
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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