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When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2132501
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References needing attention

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The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedTh�orie math�matique de la richesse sociale par Le�n Walras. Recherches sur les principes math�matiques de la th�orie des richesses par Augustin Cournot
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no DOI — not checkedDie Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschr�nkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments
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