Reference health

Matching with Incomplete Information

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2137069
CiteStamped reference-health badge
1 of 22 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

4 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 21 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1086/260084
A Theory of Marriage: Part I
resolves10.2307/1911196
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.008
Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
resolves10.1093/restud/rdu003
Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004
Two-sided matching with interdependent values
resolves10.2307/1913320
Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.02.006
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
resolves10.1257/aer.97.1.242
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
resolves10.1006/game.1994.1013
Posterior Efficiency
resolves10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80072-4
Chapter 40 Common knowledge
resolves10.2307/1912117
Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001
Stable marriages and search frictions
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1
Information, trade and common knowledge
resolves10.2307/1911197
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
resolves10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
resolves10.1017/CCOL052139015X
Two-Sided Matching
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.002
Information transmission in coalitional voting games
resolves10.1007/bf01753437
The assignment game I: The core
resolves10.2307/1909750
Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedPremuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
no DOI — not checkedVirtual Utility and the Core for Games with Incomplete Information
no DOI — not checkedref20
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-28 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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