Reference health

Financing and Signaling Decisions under Asymmetric Information

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2139372
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23/23 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 23 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1879431
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(89)90060-3
Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market
resolves10.1353/pfs.2002.0002
Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00200
An Optimal IPO Mechanism
resolves10.1006/jfin.2001.0319
IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, … French, and Internet
resolves10.1093/rfs/3.3.315
Pooling, Separating, and Semiseparating Equilibria in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1093/rfs/11.1.189
Equilibrium Dominance in Experimental Financial Markets
resolves10.2307/2331314
Why Include Warrants in New Equity Issues? A Theory of Unit IPOs
resolves10.2307/2328858
The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.05.005
Auctioned IPOs: The US evidence
resolves10.1093/rfs/16.1.31
Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets
resolves10.1093/rfs/1.3.265
A Theory of Negotiated Equity Financing
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb05063.x
Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues
resolves10.3386/w12151
Why Do IPO Auctions Fail?
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(93)90016-5
An empirical investigation of IPO returns and subsequent equity offerings
resolves10.1093/rfs/12.2.227
The Demand for Stocks: An Analysis of IPO Auctions
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00543
IPO Pricing in the Dot‐com Bubble
resolves10.2139/ssrn.331780
Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?
resolves10.1093/rfs/7.2.279
The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00478
A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.005
Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511528354.018
Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedref29
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