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Social Preferences, Accountability, and Wage Bargaining

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2150549
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1 of 40 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

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The 39 checked references that resolve
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resolves10.1257/aer.97.4.1340
Individual Behavior and Group Membership
resolves10.1162/003355302760193904
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resolves10.1257/aer.99.1.431
Group Identity and Social Preferences
resolves10.2139/ssrn.400900
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resolves10.1086/260718
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resolves10.1162/003355399556151
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resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
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resolves10.1006/game.1994.1021
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The geometry of distributional preferences and a non-parametric identification approach: The Equality Equivalence Test
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resolves10.1007/978-94-011-2378-5_5
Wage bargaining and employment
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.037
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The Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17)
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The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAn Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
no DOI — not checkedUnion Wages, Seniority and Employment
no DOI — not checkedTwo-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedDoes the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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