Reference health

How Audits Moderate the Effects of Incentives and Peer Behavior on Misreporting

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154170
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40/40 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-13

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

19 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 40 checked references that resolve
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Audits, Reputation, and Repeated Interaction in a Capital Budgeting Setting
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Capital rationing, competition, and misrepresentation in budget forecasts
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Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity‐Based Compensation and Managerial Fraud
resolves10.2308/accr-50219
Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Frame on Effort in Incomplete Contracts
resolves10.1016/j.aos.2012.01.002
Shared interest and honesty in budget reporting
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The Effects of Perceived Fairness on Opportunistic Behavior*
resolves10.2308/iace.2000.15.1.89
Project Earnings Manipulation: An Ethics Case Based on Agency Theory
resolves10.5465/amr.2007.23463701
Exposing Pay Secrecy
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Can a Code of Ethics Improve Manager Behavior and Investor Confidence? An Experimental Study
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Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*
resolves10.1037/h0046408
A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment.
resolves10.2308/accr.2001.76.4.537
Honesty in Managerial Reporting
resolves10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2
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resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x
Fairness and Contract Design
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Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
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Pay Secrecy versus Pay Disclosure for Salesmen: A Longitudinal Study
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Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior
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Deception: The Role of Consequences
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AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF DETERRENCE: CHEATING, SELF‐SERVING BIAS, AND IMPULSIVITY*
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The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
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The Effect of Honesty and Superior Authority on Budget Proposals
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Behavioral Implications of Information Systems on Disclosure Fraud
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A behavioral study of accounting variables in performance—incentive contracts
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The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness
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The 19 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedSocial cognitive theory of moral thought and action
no DOI — not checkedPersonality and social psychology review an official journal of the Society for
no DOI — not checkedAn empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud
no DOI — not checkedref12
no DOI — not checkedManagerial economics and organizational architecture
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedThe effects of pay schemes and probabilistic management audits on subordinate misrepresentation of private information: an experimental investigation in a resource allocation context
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedControls and the asymmetric stickiness of norms
no DOI — not checkedInformation policies, collusion, and honor among thieves
no DOI — not checkedCooperation and incentives why social preferences matter -the impact of non-selfish motives on competition
no DOI — not checkedPostauditing capital investments
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no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedPro-social choices are 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8a, and 9b
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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