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A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games
21/21 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-11
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 21 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2171293
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
resolves10.2307/1911307
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.004
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
resolves10.1007/bf01737554
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
resolves10.1007/s00199-005-0620-y
Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002
Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAccording to ? Player ? 0 (n) rejects, and the proposal e ? 0 (n) is made and accepted in period 1, leading to a payoff of ? ? 0 (n) to Player ? 0 (n). If Player ? 0 (n) deviates and accepts
no DOI — not checkedSuppose Player ? 0 (j) deviates and accepts. Then x 0 will be rejected by Player ? 0 (j + 1) and next period the proposal e ? 0 (j+1) will be made and accepted, thus leaving Player ? 0 (j) with zero payoff. Thus the deviation is not profitable. ? 1. If, for every i ? N
no DOI — not checkedt is the permutation chosen by nature at h ? , and x t is the proposal chosen by the Player ? t (1) at (h ? , ? t )
no DOI — not checkedn} accept x t
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checked) and Mailath and Olszewski (2011) provide folk theorems for repeated games where strategies have bounded recall
no DOI — not checkedSurvey of Repeated Games
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedA Noncooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining
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