Reference health
Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
36/36 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-09
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 36 checked references that resolve
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A General Class of Coefficients of Divergence of One Distribution from Another
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00425.x
Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.01.005
Securitization and moral hazard: Evidence from credit score cutoff rules
resolves10.1007/s00245-008-9050-0
Optimal Compensation with Hidden Action and Lump-Sum Payment in a Continuous-Time Model
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhs095
How Important is Having Skin in the Game? Originator-Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-backed Securities
resolves10.6028/jres.071b.010
Construction of EPr generalized inverses by inversion of nonsingular matrices
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00375
Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-s
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht073
Securitization and Loan Performance: Ex Ante and Ex Post Relations in the Mortgage Market
resolves10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.307
Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1886964
Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices: A New Foundation for the Multinomial Logit Model
resolves10.1006/jeth.2000.2726
Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts under Limited Liability and Monotonicity
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedDesign of financial securities: Empirical evidence from private-label rmbs deals
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedInformation-type measures of difference of probability distributions and indirect observations
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedIncentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem
no DOI — not checkedAn analysis of the principal-agent problem
no DOI — not checkedRenegotiation of sales contracts
no DOI — not checkedref45
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