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On the Coevolution of Social Norms in Primitive Societies

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2190957
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24/24 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-25

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 24 checked references that resolve
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The Ultimatum Game, Fairness, and Cooperation among Big Game Hunters
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Rousseau’s Whale Hunt?
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On the Nature of Sharing: Beyond the Range of Methodological Individualism
resolves10.1177/104346398010003001
THE EVOLUTION OF FAIRNESS NORMS
resolves10.1017/s0140525x05230145
Economic man – or straw man?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.019
Experimental economics: Where next?
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What Makes Humans Economically Distinctive? A Three-Species Evolutionary Comparison and Historical Analysis
resolves10.1525/ae.2005.32.2.198
Experimental economics in anthropology: A critical assessment
resolves10.1051/ejess:2001102
Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.004
Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
resolves10.1006/game.2001.0891
Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00119
Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00883.x
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING: A LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036855
Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and Repeated Contact?
resolves10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005
Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
resolves10.1093/0199262055.001.0001
Foundations of Human Sociality
resolves10.1007/s12110-002-1016-3
Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved human predisposition to cooperate
resolves10.4324/9780203792704-9
Sharing and Collective Action
resolves10.1086/203251
Food Sharing Among Ache Foragers: Tests of Explanatory Hypotheses [and Comments and Reply]
resolves10.1006/game.1993.1024
An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction
resolves10.1006/jeth.2001.2803
Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach
resolves10.2307/2801707
Egalitarian Societies
resolves10.1006/jeth.1993.1009
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
resolves10.2307/2951778
The Evolution of Conventions
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedAn examination of the hunting-dependent life of the Mbuti Pygmies, eastern Zaire
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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