Reference health

Bank Bailouts, Competition, and the Disparate Effects for Borrower and Depositor Welfare

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2193039
CiteStamped reference-health badge
5 of 62 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1787/9789264039773-12-en
does not resolve to a known work10.1787/9789264039773-26-en
does not resolve to a known work10.1787/mei-v2018-11-table101-en
does not resolve to a known work10.1787/mei-v2018-11-table87-en
does not resolve to a known work10.1787/mei-v2018-11-table89-en
The 57 checked references that resolve
resolves10.3386/w17838
Are Banks Passive Liquidity Backstops? Deposit Rates and Flows during the 2007-2009 Crisis
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1786303
State Ownership and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Indian Financial Sector During 2007-09
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2006.06.001
Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002
Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhr121
Assessing TARP
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001
Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity
resolves10.1093/wbro/lkn008
Access to Financial Services: Measurement, Impact, and Policies
resolves10.1093/wber/15.1.165
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions
resolves10.1093/wber/14.3.597
A New Database on the Structure and Development of the Financial Sector
resolves10.3386/w8752
Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks
resolves10.3386/w8841
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00513
Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability
resolves10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02005-4
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp039
Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak
resolves10.1162/003355305775097506
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.006
The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.05.010
What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions
resolves10.1353/mcb.2004.0044
What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00841.x
Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets
resolves10.1016/s1042-9573(03)00046-9
Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhs056
Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2007.06.001
The real effect of banking crises
resolves10.1016/j.jimonfin.2006.04.004
Inside the crisis: An empirical analysis of banking systems in distress
resolves10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00171-X
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.011
Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2164072
Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’ Response to Government Aid
resolves10.1257/aer.102.1.60
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2012.08.001
The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness
resolves10.1017/S0020818300033208
Political responses to interdependence: what's “left” for the left?
resolves10.1257/0002828041464650
Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts
resolves10.1257/mac.5.1.135
On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro Evidence from Japan
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq114
Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1571011
The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2009.05.006
Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies
resolves10.2307/2971733
Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.005
Will the U.S. bank recapitalization succeed? Eight lessons from Japan
resolves10.2307/2331398
Measuring Rents and Interest Rate Risk in Imperfect Financial Markets: The Case of Retail Bank Deposits
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.001
Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05104.x
Principal‐Agent Problems in S&L Salvage
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00787.x
The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower Welfare
resolves10.1596/1813-9450-4978
Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate And Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008
resolves10.1162/rest_a_00155
Enjoying the Quiet Life under Deregulation? Evidence from Adjusted Lerner Indices for U.S. Banks
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04070.x
Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual‐to‐Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00422
Government Ownership of Banks
resolves10.1016/j.jimonfin.2012.01.014
The use of blanket guarantees in banking crises
resolves10.1006/jfin.1994.1007
A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure
resolves10.1353/mcb.2004.0048
How Foreign Participation and Market Concentration Impact Bank Spreads: Evidence from Latin America
resolves10.1016/0378-4266(77)90015-2
An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory
resolves10.2307/2098582
Testing For "Monopoly" Equilibrium
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn051
Harming Depositors and Helping Borrowers: The Disparate Impact of Bank Consolidation
resolves10.2307/2118445
The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.12.001
Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects
resolves10.3386/w11728
Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?
resolves10.3386/w12591
Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics During the Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Federal Reserve District Border in Mississippi, 1929 to 1933
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.10.002
The effects of government ownership on bank lending
resolves10.2307/2118354
Politicians and Firms
resolves10.1007/978-1-4020-6754-9_17210
Transcription Unit
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedThe regulation and supervision of banks around the world -a new database
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedBank liquidity creation and risk taking during distress
no DOI — not checkedHazelwood (forthcoming) The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedDeposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedforthcoming) The impact of government intervention in banks on corporate borrowers' stock returns
no DOI — not checkedSchnabl (forthcoming) Efficient recapitalization
no DOI — not checkedref70
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedref73
no DOI — not checkedref74
no DOI — not checkedref77
no DOI — not checkedref80
no DOI — not checkedref82
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2193039"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2193039/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2193039/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2193039)