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Quantile Stable Matchings for Markets with Contracts

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2194458
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1 of 24 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2323645
The 23 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2194458
Quantile Stable Matchings for Markets with Contracts
resolves10.2307/1911460
Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
resolves10.1257/0002828054825466
Matching with Contracts
resolves10.1287/moor.28.1.103.14256
A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.007
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002
Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
resolves10.1257/aer.103.1.80
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
resolves10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7
Core-selecting package auctions
resolves10.1086/261272
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
resolves10.1257/000282803322157061
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
resolves10.2139/ssrn.691443
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
resolves10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions
resolves10.1287/moor.1060.0207
Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
resolves10.1287/moor.23.4.874
The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.004
Median stable matching for markets with wages
resolves10.1007/s00355-010-0455-8
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
resolves10.2307/1913392
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
resolves10.1257/aer.103.5.2050
Matching with Contracts: Comment
resolves10.1007/s001990100179
A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
resolves10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.012
The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
resolves10.1017/CCOL052139015X
Two-Sided Matching
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(84)90152-2
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedref27
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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