Reference health

Do Option-Like Incentives Induce Overvaluation? Evidence from Exerimental Asset Markets

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2205587
CiteStamped reference-health badge
17/17 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

4 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1086/516389
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.012
Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.005
Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00581
High‐Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts
resolves10.1287/mnsc.35.7.807
Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00868.x
The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets
resolves10.2307/1061659
Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.995
Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.001
Market microstructure matters when imposing a Tobin tax—Evidence from the lab
resolves10.1257/aer.102.2.865
Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles
resolves10.2469/faj.v43.n1.21
Incentive Fees: Some Problems and Some Solutions
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00222
Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00444.x
MARKET EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM A NO‐BUBBLE ASSET MARKET EXPERIMENT
resolves10.1257/jep.21.2.153
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-036X.2006.00330.x
Has Finance Made the World Riskier?
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedForschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. Goettingen: GWDG Bericht 63
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-28 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

view as graph · paper page

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2205587"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2205587/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2205587/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.2205587)