Reference health
Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment
2 of 88 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-05
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0022-3514.58.4.568
does not resolve to a known work10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00497.x
The 86 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01452.x
Are Religious People More Prosocial? A Quasi‐Experimental Study with <i>Madrasah</i> Pupils in a Rural Community in India
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00302
Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
resolves10.2307/3053901
The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing a Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault
resolves10.1080/01639620701233324
Moral Beliefs, Isolation from Peers, and Abstention from Delinquency
resolves10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.03.015
Is fairness blind?—The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules
resolves10.1006/game.1996.0013
Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2132501
When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives
resolves10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01008-6
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
resolves10.1257/aer.100.1.541
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02076.x
Evidence from an Experiment on Charity to Welfare Recipients: Reciprocity, Altruism and the Empathic Responsiveness Hypothesis
resolves10.1257/app.1.2.64
What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty
resolves10.1257/0002828043052187
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
resolves10.1017/s0140525x05000142
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.1992.tb01117.x
RISK PERCEPTIONS AMONG SERIOUS OFFENDERS: THE ROLE OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT*
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2009.05.002
Social environments with competitive pressure: Gender effects in the decisions of German schoolchildren
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.2000.tb00887.x
MANAGING RETALIATION: DRUG ROBBERY AND INFORMAL SANCTION THREATS*
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01052.x
THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT REVISITED*
resolves10.1257/089533004773563485
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1772185
'A Good Man Always Knows His Limitations': Overconfidence in Criminal Offending
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.2011.00251.x
ON AMBIGUITY IN PERCEPTIONS OF RISK:IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND DETERRENCE*
resolves10.1007/s10940-011-9163-5
Hyperbolic Time Discounting, Offender Time Preferences and Deterrence
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.1991.tb01080.x
THE PREVENTIVE EFFECTS OF THE PERCEIVED RISK OF ARREST: TESTING AN EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF DETERRENCE
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.1994.tb01166.x
PERSONAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL: THE DETERRENCE IMPLICATIONS OF A THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CRIMINAL OFFENDING*
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.2001.tb00943.x
INTEGRATING CELERITY, IMPULSIVITY, AND EXTRALEGAL SANCTION THREATS INTO A MODEL OF GENERAL DETERRENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.2003.tb00985.x
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF DETERRENCE: CHEATING, SELF‐SERVING BIAS, AND IMPULSIVITY*
resolves10.1023/b:exec.0000026978.14316.74
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
resolves10.2307/3054128
Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime
resolves10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00534.x
DISCERNING UNFAIRNESS WHERE OTHERS MAY NOT: LOW SELF‐CONTROL AND UNFAIR SANCTION PERCEPTIONS
resolves10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102510-105404
Elaborating the Individual Difference Component in Deterrence Theory
resolves10.1111/j.1813-6982.2008.00174.x
WHAT'S IN A NAME? RACIAL IDENTITY AND ALTRUISM IN POST‐APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedDoing Good with Other People's Money. A Charitable Giving Experiment with Students in
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedToo Smart to Be Selfish?
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedDo Individual Characteristics Explain Variation in Sanction Risk Updating Among Serious Juvenile Offenders? Advancing the Logic of Differential Deterrence
no DOI — not checkedDesistance and the Feared Self. Toward an Identity Theory of Criminal Desistance
no DOI — not checkedDie Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschr�nkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments
no DOI — not checkedCompetitive Market Institutions. Double Auction vs. Sealed BidOffer
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