Reference health
Executive Compensation in Emerging Markets: Theoretical Developments and Empirical Evidence
45/45 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 45 checked references that resolve
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CEO compensation and large shareholders: Evidence from emerging markets
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The 16 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedDetermination of executive compensation in an emerging economy: Evidence from India. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
no DOI — not checkedExecutive compensation: A reassessment and a future research agenda
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedExecutive board member's remuneration: A longitudinal study
no DOI — not checkedExecutive compensation, ownership structure and firm performance in Chinese financial corporations
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedExecutive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance: An empirical analysis
no DOI — not checkedThe Philippines
no DOI — not checkedAge, experience and remuneration of managers of seven large Indian firms
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