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Nonlinear Incentive Schemes and Corruption in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2257392
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39/39 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

14 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 39 checked references that resolve
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Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
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The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
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Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets
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Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
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Nonparametric Econometrics
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Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions
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Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?
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Eight Questions about Corruption
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewn002
Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis
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Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball
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Forensic Economics
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2257392
Nonlinear Incentive Schemes and Corruption in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic
The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedEvaluation of Public Procurement Directives
no DOI — not checkedThe Bootstrap
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no DOI — not checkedGovernment at a Glance 2009
no DOI — not checkedUkazatele transparentnosti trhu ve?ejn�ch zak�zek v ?esk� Republice
no DOI — not checkedOdhad neefektivn? vynalo?en�ch ve?ejn�ch zdroj? ve ve?ejn�ch zak�zk�ch
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no DOI — not checkedPrinted by CERGE-EI
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