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Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2260000
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37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-04

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 37 checked references that resolve
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Determinants of collective action on the local commons: a model with evidence from Mexico
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The conditions of collective action for local commons management: the case of irrigation in the Philippines
resolves10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
The Tragedy of the Commons
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Development Economics
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Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management
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The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedDoes Infrastructure Facilitate Social Capital Accumulation? Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in Sri Lanka
no DOI — not checkedInequality, Collective Action, and the Environment: Evidence from Firewood Collection in Nepal
no DOI — not checkedref23
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no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedMotives behind Community Participation: Evidence from Natural and Field Experiments in a Developing Country
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