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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290373
CiteStamped reference-health badge
19/19 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-11

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 19 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511755323
Lévy Processes and Stochastic Calculus
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00425.x
Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
resolves10.3982/ecta7261
Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
resolves10.3982/ecta9557
Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00439.x
Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
resolves10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
resolves10.2307/1913238
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00737.x
Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
resolves10.1214/07-aop384
Concentration inequalities for dependent random variables via the martingale method
resolves10.1002/zamm.19910710120
Siemons, J. (ed.), Surveys in Combinatorics, 1989. Cambridge etc., Cambridge University Press. 1989, VIII, 217 pp., £ 17.50 P/b. ISBN 0‐521‐37823‐0 (London Mathematical Society. Lecture Note Series 141)
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295211.003.0003
Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty
resolves10.3982/ecta9737
Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy
resolves10.2307/1912747
Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
resolves10.2307/1911017
Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.x
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
resolves10.3982/ecta6420
The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
resolves10.2307/2297484
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedLocally Sub-Gaussian Random Variables and the Strong Law of Large Numbers
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref25
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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