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On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: When More Means Less

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317268
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19/19 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 19 checked references that resolve
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Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
resolves10.2307/1884639
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
resolves10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00609.x
Bidding for Cattle in the Texas Panhandle
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1050.0432
The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction’s Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?
resolves10.1111/j.1744-7976.1999.tb00223.x
Testing the Competitiveness of a Multistage Food Marketing System: The Canadian Chicken Industry
resolves10.1006/game.2000.0802
Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects
resolves10.1002/agr.20078
Estimating bargaining strengths of Canadian chicken producers and processors using a bilateral monopoly framework
resolves10.2307/1912352
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
resolves10.1006/jeth.1999.2510
A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands
resolves10.1007/s001820400186
Declining valuations in sequential auctions
resolves10.1007/s001990050260
Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited
resolves10.1111/j.1744-7976.2004.tb00369.x
Low‐Price Low‐Capacity Traps and Government Intervention in the Québec Hog Market
resolves10.2202/1935-1704.1600
Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511813825
Putting Auction Theory to Work
resolves10.1007/s10660-005-6160-5
Performance Evaluation of Multi-Object Auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00571.x
The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5982.2012.01720.x
Import sensitive products and perverse tariff‐rate quota liberalization
resolves10.1016/S1874-8651(08)60072-1
Two-Stage Procurement Auction with Bidders of Asymmetric Capacity
resolves10.1163/2213-2996_flg_com_047162
Canada - Census, Standards & Statistics
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedAllocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders
no DOI — not checkedMultiplicity of Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
no DOI — not checkedAuctions with Endogenous Values: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited
no DOI — not checkedInformation Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions
no DOI — not checkedref27
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