Reference health
Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games
31/31 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 31 checked references that resolve
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Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods
resolves10.2307/2234532
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1628/093245616x14610627109836
Cooperation in Partnerships: The Role of Breakups and Reputation
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006
Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
resolves10.1257/aer.100.1.541
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.303
Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation among like-Minded People
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.008
Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments
resolves10.1177/0022002701045006004
Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games
resolves10.1016/j.socec.2011.12.005
From locality to continent: A comment on the generalization of an experimental study
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.001
Ostracism and the provision of a public good: experimental evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005
Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1
End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedMobility and Cooperation: on the Run
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedLinear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis
no DOI — not checkedTest results for the equality of the coefficient of variable (a) across treatments are found in Appendix Table B.1. Ex-post efficiency of the ranking procedure is measured by calculating the bivariate correlations between matched pairs' their past contribution decisions
no DOI — not checkedref38
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