Reference health

A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2348634
CiteStamped reference-health badge
37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 37 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/1468-2354.00110
Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02512.x
Learning from the Crowd: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database
resolves10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4
Log-concave probability and its applications
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00369.x
COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1177/0092070394221002
Price, Product Information, and Purchase Intention: An Empirical Study
resolves10.1287/mksc.1040.0089
Third-Party Product Review and Firm Marketing Strategy
resolves10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00218.x
Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly
resolves10.1086/374180
Is More Information Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers
resolves10.1086/296331
Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosures
resolves10.2307/2491297
Industry-Wide Disclosure Dynamics
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(89)90108-7
Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets
resolves10.1016/0166-0462(93)90005-y
Quality variations in the circular model of variety-differentiated products
resolves10.1093/jleo/19.1.45
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(79)90041-3
Price competition, quality and income disparities
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02161.x
Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids
resolves10.1086/466995
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00340.x
STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: THE CASE OF MULTIATTRIBUTE PRODUCTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMERS
resolves10.1162/003355303321675428
The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
resolves10.2307/3003428
Truthful Disclosure of Information
resolves10.1016/j.elerap.2010.04.001
Do online reviews reflect a product’s true perceived quality? An investigation of online movie reviews across cultures
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00366.x
QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.5860/choice.49-5773
In the plex: how Google thinks, works, and shapes our lives
resolves10.1287/isre.1070.0154
Self-Selection and Information Role of Online Product Reviews
resolves10.1086/467468
The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market
resolves10.2307/2555561
Quality Testing and Disclosure
resolves10.2307/3003562
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
resolves10.1086/261408
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
resolves10.2307/2555625
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1030.0151
Designing a Better Shopbot
resolves10.2307/2297541
Strategic Information Revelation
resolves10.2307/3003323
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods
resolves10.2307/2555851
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1040.0288
Research Note: Additional Learning and Implications on the Role of Informative Advertising
resolves10.2202/1534-598x.1151
Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty
resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00287.x
Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3
Discretionary disclosure
resolves10.2307/2297767
Prices as Signals of Product Quality
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedCompetition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of hmos
no DOI — not checkedEa to release paid dlc before boxed games
no DOI — not checkedref40
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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