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Pay Inequity and Job Performance: An Insider-Econometrics Study

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350770
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56/56 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-07

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Role of Firm Size and Performance Pay in Determining
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedWage Dispersion and Workers' effort
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