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Does Political Uncertainty Increase External Financing Costs? Measuring the Electoral Premium in Syndicated Lending
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does not resolve to a known work10.2139/ssrn.1992200
The 51 checked references that resolve
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Is the Corporate Loan Market Globally Integrated? A Pricing Puzzle
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Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942–2008
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How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants
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The Employment Effects of Credit Market Disruptions: Firm-level Evidence from the 2008–9 Financial Crisis
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An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures
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Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections
resolves10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.08.004
Policy uncertainty, irreversibility, and cross-border flows of capital
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The Price of Political Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence from the Option Market
resolves10.1162/003355305775097524
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
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Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market
resolves10.1162/0033553053327443
Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01293.x
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Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans
resolves10.7717/peerj.6889/table-5
Table 5: Difference in facial indices and transverse measurements between growing vs non-growing patients.
resolves10.1163/2468-0303-cohu_25-100
HUG 25, ff. 179r-181r, inc. linea AGHB ejus naturae ut GC sit ad HD,
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedReputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting
no DOI — not checkedFor Wall Street, Obama's reelection means no dismantling of DoddFrank law
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref50
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no DOI — not checkedElection dummy is set to one when a loan is issued during the period between 9 months leading up to and 3 months after a lender country's election. Columns (1) and (2) use all sample and columns (3) and (4) use foreign loans only, analogous to the samples used in columns (1) and (5) of table 2. Borrower covariates included in columns (2) and (4) are the same as those used in the baseline specification. The sample size in this table is smaller compared to table 2 because borrower � year specification picks up the variation within a borrower across lenders in the same year
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedref59
no DOI — not checked) are equivalent to those in panel A of table 2, but using the relevant subsample as indicated by column headings. Columns (3) and (6) conducts the t-tests of the differences between domestic and foreign sample estimates by including the interaction term between election and foreign dummy. A standard set of covariates and its interaction with foreign dummy are included to allow for variation in coefficients by loan types
no DOI — not checkedref62
no DOI — not checkedThe sample in this table is restricted to foreign loans where a borrower and a lender are from different countries. The election dummy is set to one when a loan is issued during the period between 9 months leading up to and 3 months after a borrower country's election. Columns (1) and (2) report results for a specification without the margin of victory interaction term, and columns (3) and (4) include interactions. All regressions include borrower and lender fixed effects
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