Reference health
Economic Experiments and Environmental Policy: A Review
1 of 101 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
16 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1007/bf01669198
The 100 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2118508
Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments
resolves10.1257/aer.99.1.544
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
resolves10.1006/jeem.1999.1080
Heterogeneity, Irreversible Production Choices, and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets
resolves10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00173.x
How sustainable is participatory watershed development in India?
resolves10.1016/j.jeem.2008.03.004
Trust and cooperation: Social capital and community resource management
resolves10.1126/science.1152110
Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine "The Moral Sentiments": Evidence from Economic Experiments
resolves10.1023/A:1023665517698
Buyer Liability and Voluntary Inspections in International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Study
resolves10.1023/A:1008075721806
An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.007
Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking
resolves10.1002/pam.20007
Using laboratory experiments for policymaking: An example from the Georgia irrigation reduction auction
resolves10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
resolves10.1007/s10683-010-9266-0
Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games
resolves10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0
Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
resolves10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.05.006
Salinity in water markets: An experimental investigation of the Sunraysia Salinity Levy in Australia
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
resolves10.1006/jeem.1993.1001
An Experimental Investigation of the Hahn-Noll Revenue Neutral Auction for Emissions Licenses
resolves10.1006/jeem.1997.0977
Emissions Trading with Shares and Coupons when Control over Discharges Is Uncertain
resolves10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00522.x
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
resolves10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00081-9
Chapter 81 Experimental Evidence on the Existence of Hypothetical Bias in Value Elicitation Methods
resolves10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.004
Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation
resolves10.1257/aer.91.2.73
In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies
resolves10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00669.x
Who Do Consumers Trust for Information: The Case of Genetically Modified Foods?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.019
The effects of prior beliefs and learning on consumers’ acceptance of genetically modified foods
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01713.x
PAYOFF DOMINANCE VS. COGNITIVE TRANSPARENCY IN DECISION MAKING
resolves10.2307/1882648
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x
COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM
resolves10.1007/s10683-014-9411-2
Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games
resolves10.1023/A:1012791822804
What Experimental Protocol Influence Disparities Between Actual and Hypothetical Stated Values?
resolves10.1257/000282803321455359
Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
resolves10.7551/mitpress/2604.003.0007
A Survey of Economic Theories and Field Evidence on Pro-Social Behavior
resolves10.1073/pnas.0709546105
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change
resolves10.1006/jeem.2001.1195
Can Double Auctions Control Monopoly and Monopsony Power in Emissions Trading Markets?
resolves10.1023/A:1026598014870
The Design of ``Smart'' Water Market Institutions Using Laboratory Experiments
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.013
Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis
resolves10.1016/j.jeem.2006.08.003
A laboratory investigation of compliance behavior under tradable emissions rights: Implications for targeted enforcement
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00594-8
Do consumers not care about biotech foods or do they just not read the labels?
resolves10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00179.x
Do Consumers Really Refuse to Buy Genetically Modified Food?
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2003.06.004
Revealing consumers' willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.007
The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656202.003.0010
Global Environmental Problems, Voluntary Action, and Government Intervention
resolves10.1016/0022-2496(78)90030-5
Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00017.x
EFFECTS AND VALUE OF VERIFIABLE INFORMATION IN A CONTROVERSIAL MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM LAB AUCTIONS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
resolves10.4337/9781781009079.00019
A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game
resolves10.1016/j.jeem.2010.10.010
An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets
resolves10.1073/pnas.1102493108
Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
resolves10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.12.018
Bringing biophysical models into the economic laboratory: An experimental analysis of sediment trading in Australia
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
The 16 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-out Hypothesis
no DOI — not checkedCooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedThe Methodology of Positive Economics
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedref66
no DOI — not checkedAlternative Calibration and Auction Institutions for Predicting Consumer Willingness to Pay forNon-Genetically Modifi ed Corn Chips
no DOI — not checkedAuction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions
no DOI — not checkedExperiments on Collective Risk
no DOI — not checkedref97
no DOI — not checkedref108
no DOI — not checkedref110
no DOI — not checkedAuctions and Bidding Games
no DOI — not checkedAvoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster
no DOI — not checkedMultiple-object auctions
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