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Can Efficient Institutions Induce Cooperation Among Low Trust Agents?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376709
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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

14 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 35 checked references that resolve
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Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
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Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
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The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth
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Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey
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Good Government Means Different Things in Different Countries
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Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the 'Narrow Data Base'
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The Hard Problem of Cooperation
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Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua
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Syndromes of Corruption
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Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
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Voting for Autocracy
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Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot
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Theories of “bad policy”
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Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
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The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust
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The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedFrom Ancien R�gime to Capitalism: the Spread of the French Revolution as a Natural Experiment
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no DOI — not checkedClientelism as Persuasion and as Mobilization
no DOI — not checkedScholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States
no DOI — not checkedref48
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What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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