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Institutional Directors and Board Compensation: Spanish Evidence

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400391
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The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedThe influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behaviour
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedChallenging board performance
no DOI — not checkedEndogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO
no DOI — not checkedref61
no DOI — not checkedRetribuci�n de los altos directivos y gobierno corporativo en las empresas cotizadas espa�olas
no DOI — not checkedref67
no DOI — not checkedEnding the stalemate: take a second look at the SEC's 1997 Release 34-39093
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