Reference health

Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks' 'Too Big to Fail' Subsidy

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2403441
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13/13 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 13 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.11.006
The Chrysler effect: The impact of government intervention on borrowing costs
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.07.015
Market discipline of banks: Why are yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures not sensitive to bank risks?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2328705
International Evidence on Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1003163
How Much Would Banks Be Willing to Pay to Become 'Too-Big-to-Fail' and to Capture Other Benefits
resolves10.1596/1813-9450-5360
Are Banks Too Big To Fail Or Too Big To Save ? International Evidence From Equity Prices And CDS Spreads
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1102494
Spoilt and Lazy: The Impact of State Support on Bank Behaviour in the International Loan Market
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq114
Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2009.05.006
Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04072.x
Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983–1991
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2482352
Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03729.x
Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being “Too Big to Fail”
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.05.004
Gains in bank mergers: Evidence from the bond markets
resolves10.1353/mcb.2003.0022
Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedThe $100 Billion Question
no DOI — not checkedQuantifying the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees for Large Financial Institutions
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedref22
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-28 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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