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An Experimental Study of a Common Property Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time
49/49 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 49 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.005
Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under uncertainty
resolves10.1006/jeem.2000.1173
Individual Response, Information, and Intergenerational Common Pool Problems
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.008
On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly
resolves10.1006/jeem.1993.1023
International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0115
Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets
resolves10.1006/game.1997.0541
An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons
resolves10.1111/1368-423x.00025
Data mining reconsidered: encompassing and the general‐to‐specific approach to specification search
resolves10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00058-0
Computer automation of general-to-specific model selection procedures
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2283126
Feedback Equilibria in a Dynamic Renewable Resource Oligopoly: Pre-Emption, Voracity and Exhaustion
resolves10.1006/jeem.1997.1006
Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.008
The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources
resolves10.1109/wsc.2010.5679163
The initial transient in steady-state point estimation: Contexts, a bibliography, the mse criterion, and the MSER statistic
resolves10.1016/s0928-7655(02)00002-7
A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(90)90071-q
Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1961450
An Experimental Investigation of Strategies in the Dynamic Common Pool Game
resolves10.1006/jeem.1994.1001
Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing
resolves10.1016/0014-2921(94)00036-y
Leviathan governments and carbon taxes: Costs and potential benefits
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00016-x
Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods: Extension to nonlinear strategies
The 1 reference without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study
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