Reference health

Pricing Under Noisy Signaling

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2408905
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2 of 20 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-09-13

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2327113
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2328597
The 18 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(89)90060-3
Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market
resolves10.1016/j.jempfin.2003.10.002
Testing dividend signaling models
resolves10.2307/3003330
Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(95)00850-e
Reversal of fortune dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.12.002
Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes
resolves10.1023/B:REQU.0000025761.14094.70
Forum Selection in International Business Contracts: Home Bias Portfolio Puzzle and Managerial Moral Hazard
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.12.004
Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x
Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
resolves10.2307/2326770
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
resolves10.1007/s11156-012-0295-y
The quality of public information and the term structure of interest rates
resolves10.1093/rfs/7.2.279
The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories
resolves10.2307/3003562
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02362.x
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(93)90016-5
An empirical investigation of IPO returns and subsequent equity offerings
resolves10.2469/faj.v55.n5.2302
Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker Incentives
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(75)90049-6
Competitive signalling
resolves10.2307/3003485
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach
resolves10.2307/1882010
Job Market Signaling
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedThe Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
no DOI — not checkedMutual Fund Share Classes and Conflicts of Interest between Brokers and Investors Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker Incentives
no DOI — not checkedThe Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
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